The Dynamics of REIT Pricing Efficiency by Aguilar, Mike et al.
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration
The Scholarly Commons
Articles and Chapters School of Hotel Administration Collection
2017
The Dynamics of REIT Pricing Efficiency
Mike Aguilar
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Walter I. Boudry
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration, wb242@cornell.edu
Robert A. Connolly
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the Real Estate Commons
This Article or Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection at The Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aguilar, M., Boudry, W. I., & Connolly, R. A. (2017). The Dynamics of REIT pricing efficiency. Real Estate Economics. Advance online
publication. doi: 10.1111/1540-6229.12210
The Dynamics of REIT Pricing Efficiency
Abstract
We study the dynamics of pricing efficiency in the equity REIT market from 1993 to 2014. We measure
pricing efficiency at the firm level using variance ratios calculated from quote midpoints in the TAQ database.
We find four main results. First, on average, the market is efficient, with variance ratios close to one. However,
in any given year, there is considerable cross-sectional variation in variance ratios, suggesting at least some
firms are priced inefficiently. Second, higher institutional ownership by active institutional investors is related
to better pricing efficiency, while passive ownership does not reduce pricing efficiency. Third, REITs that are
included in the S&P 500 and S&P 400 are priced more efficiently than other REITs. For the S&P 500 firms,
we find evidence that this was purely driven by sample selection, while for S&P 400 firms, we find evidence
that it is inclusion in the index that drives efficiency. Finally, we find evidence that firm investment, analyst
coverage and debt capital raising activity can influence pricing efficiency.
Keywords
equity markets, REIT efficiency, REIT pricing data, firm level pricing efficiency
Disciplines
Finance and Financial Management | Real Estate
Comments
Required Publisher Statement
© American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
This article or chapter is available at The Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/1070
2017 V00 0: pp. 1–33
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.12210
REAL ESTATE
ECONOMICS
The Dynamics of REIT Pricing Efficiency
Mike Aguilar,* Walter I. Boudry** and Robert A. Connolly***
We study the dynamics of pricing efficiency in the equity REIT market from 1993
to 2014. We measure pricing efficiency at the firm level using variance ratios
calculated from quotemidpoints in the TAQdatabase.We find four main results.
First, on average, the market is efficient, with variance ratios close to one.
However, in any given year, there is considerable cross-sectional variation in
variance ratios, suggesting at least some firms are priced inefficiently. Second,
higher institutional ownership by active institutional investors is related to better
pricing efficiency, while passive ownership does not reduce pricing efficiency.
Third, REITs that are included in the S&P 500 and S&P 400 are priced more
efficiently than other REITs. For the S&P 500 firms, we find evidence that this was
purely driven by sample selection, while for S&P 400 firms, we find evidence
that it is inclusion in the index that drives efficiency. Finally, we find evidence
that firm investment, analyst coverage and debt capital raising activity can
influence pricing efficiency.
Introduction
The efficiency of price discovery in the equity markets is of enduring inter-
est, and this is no less true in the equity market for securitized real-estate
(REITs). For many investors, particularly institutional investors who do not
want to own buildings or land, real estate-related portfolio diversification is
often undertaken in the REIT market.1 Price discovery is no less important
for the managers themselves. The capital constrained nature of the REIT in-
dustry makes efficient access to capital a critical issue for the industry. As
such, understanding the determinants of efficient pricing at the REIT level is
important to both investors and managers alike.
*Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel
Hill, NC or maguilar@email.unc.edu.
**School of Hotel Administration, Cornell SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell
University, Ithaca, NY or wb242@cornell.edu.
***Department of Finance, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Car-
olina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC or robert_connolly@unc.edu.
1See Boudry, deRoos and Ukhov (2016) for a discussion of the diversification benefits
of REIT stock.
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Prior literature on REIT efficiency has focused on index-level returns.2 Con-
sequently, the literature does not address important cross-sectional issues. For
example, examining pricing efficiency at the firm level allows us to address
the debate in the popular press about the effects of active versus passive in-
stitutional investors on pricing efficiency.3 This debate is particularly relevant
for the REIT industry, because REIT ownership has become dominated by
passive institutional investors since 2001, when REITs were first included in
the major S&P indices. Compared to the universe of non-REITs, REITs have
approximately twice the level of passive institutional ownership.
With these motivations in mind, there have been several studies examining
firm-level efficiency in the broader equities markets.4 However, these studies
typically exclude REITs and other securities such as ADRs and ETFs. The
question then becomes, are REITs different enough from the rest of the eq-
uities markets to warrant a separate investigation? We believe this is the case
for several reasons. First, REITs are more transparent than regular firms. Part
of the requirements in 26 U.S.C. §856 for a firm to maintain REIT tax status
are restrictions on asset ownership and income sources. The result of these
restrictions is that the equity REITs in our sample hold commercial properties
as their assets. The ability to price the firm’s underlying assets (although in
a somewhat illiquid secondary market) provides a degree of transparency not
observed in a regular sample of firms. Greater transparency should lead to
greater price efficiency. Second, REITs are heavily dependent on capital mar-
kets to fund investment due to their restrictive distribution requirements. Their
reliance on capital markets to fund investment suggests that they may face
higher levels of monitoring, which could improve efficiency. Third, REITs
tend to be small to mid-cap in size. The size of the firms suggests that a poor
market microstructure may play a role in their pricing efficiency. Finally, the
industry has gone through massive structural changes since the early 1990s.
Prior to this time, there were restrictions on institutional ownership and the
industry was viewed as fairly unsophisticated. Probably, the best indication
of this is that it was not until 2001 that REITs were eligible to join the major
S&P indexes. Taken together, these factors all suggest that REIT efficiency
warrants its own investigation.
The first contribution of our article is to provide a comprehensive assessment
of REIT market efficiency at the level of the individual REIT over the modern
2See, for example, Stevenson (2002) and Jirasakuldech and Knight (2005).
3See, for example, Krouse, Benoit and McGinty (2016).
4See Boehmer and Kelley (2009), O’Hara and Ye (2011) and Conrad, Wahal and
Xiang (2015) for recent examples.
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REIT era. Prior firm-level studies typically focus on time periods before 1993.
At that time, the REIT market was characterized by microcap stocks and
limited investor attention, vastly different from the REIT market today. We
construct the cross-sectional empirical distribution of market efficiency using
REIT-level variance ratios estimated using quarterly samples of intraday quote
midpoints. Although complete data and computational details are provided
later in the article, intuitively, the variance ratio exploits the fact that under
the assumption of prices following a random walk, the variance of returns
scale linearly with the holding period (the variance of k-period returns should
be equal to k times the variance of 1-period returns; hence, the ratio of the
variance of k-period returns to k times the variance of 1-period returns should
be equal to one in an efficient market). The variance ratio is also related to
return predictability. The two-period variance ratio can be shown to equal
1 + ρ(1), where ρ(1) is the first-order serial correlation coefficient of returns.
Hence, a variance ratio of 1 implies no short-term return predictability.5 We
find that the mean of these distributions are centered very close to one,
signaling average price efficiency. Yet, these distributions also show a high
degree of excess kurtosis, indicating that a number of REITs appear to be
inefficiently priced at any given point in time.
The second contribution of our article is to identify REIT-specific factors that
account for the cross-sectional dynamics within the distribution of measured
price efficiency. Although factors have been identified in research focused on
equities generally (see Boehmer and Kelley 2009), there is, to the best of our
knowledge, no comparable investigation in the REIT literature. We separate
these factors into three categories: (1) Information Processing; (2) Information
Production; and (3) Information Pricing. Information Processing factors, such
as institutional ownership, relate to the ability to process information related
to pricing. Information Production are factors, such as analyst coverage, that
are related to greater availability of information about the firm. Information
Pricing factors are microstructure variables that measure potential impedi-
ments, caused by the trading mechanism, to information being impounded
into prices. Proxies for these categories need not be mutually exclusive. In-
stitutional ownership could be related to both information processing (certain
investors have a better ability to process information) and information produc-
tion (certain institutions may have a greater ability to uncover price-relevant
information).
5Our study focuses on short-horizon predictability using variance ratios. There is a
literature examining long-horizon predictability, but it employs predictive regressions
and is focused on time-varying expected returns rather than pricing efficiency. See
Stambaugh (1999) and MacKinnon and Zaman (2009) for a recent application in real
estate.
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We find several characteristics that drive REIT efficiency. First, as in Boehmer
and Kelley (2009), we find that greater institutional ownership is related to in-
creased pricing efficiency. However, unlike like Boehmer and Kelley (2009),
this result is not driven by aggregate institutional ownership. Efficiency bene-
fits are only observed for active ownership. We find a one standard deviation
increase in ownership by funds in the top decile of portfolio turnover is
associated with a 2.3% improvement in measured efficiency. While we do
not find any robust evidence that passive institutional investors help improve
efficiency, we also find no evidence to suggest that they reduce efficiency. Al-
though the dramatic increase in institutional ownership observed in the REIT
market since 2001 has been driven largely by passive investors, this has not
led to a decrease in pricing efficiency in the market.
Second, REITs included in the S&P 500 and S&P 400 are priced more
efficiently than other REITs, while there is no effect for the small-cap S&P
600. In terms of economic magnitude, S&P 500 firms are on average 25%
more efficient and S&P 400 firms are on average 15% more efficient than other
firms. To address the issue of identification—that indexes may choose to only
include efficient firms—we examine pre- and postinclusion efficiency in small
windows around the index addition date. We find no significant difference in
efficiency for S&P 500 firms or for S&P 600 firms, but there is a significant
improvement in efficiency for S&P 400 firms. This suggests REITs added
to the S&P 500 were already priced efficiently. However, inclusion in the
mid-cap S&P 400 is a significant event. The likely explanation for this is that
addition to this index takes a firm from small-cap obscurity and places it on
the investment screens of more investors.
Third, we find some evidence that information providers can improve the pric-
ing efficiency of REITs. More analyst coverage is associated with improved
pricing efficiency. This is consistent with results found for general equities,
but somewhat contradicts some previous results in the REIT literature. While
Boehmer and Kelley (2009) find analyst coverage to have beneficial effects
for general equities, Downs and Gu¨ner (1999, 2000) find that greater analyst
coverage in REITs tends to be associated with lower liquidity. In this case,
we would expect inferior pricing efficiency. We believe that this result is
largely driven by the time period examined. Downs and Gu¨ner (1999, 2000)
cover only the earliest part of our sample period, and our results related to
the changing dynamics of REIT efficiency highlight how difficult it can be to
extrapolate results from earlier sample periods to the current REIT market.
Finally, we document that firm investment activity can impact effi-
ciency. In our sample, a one standard deviation increase in investment or
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divestment activity is associated with a 3.8% improvement in pricing
efficiency.
In the next section, we provide more detail on the existing literature, including
papers from both the equity market microstructure and the REIT market
research areas. The section “Data and Methods” explains our research design
in detail, and also discusses our dataset and measurement issues. We present
the basic picture of REIT market efficiency in the section “REIT Efficiency
over Time.” The section “Determinants of Efficiency Dynamics” extends
the analysis to consider what REIT-level and market factors are associated
with REIT-level efficiency dynamics. We summarize our findings in the final
section.
Previous Literature
Our article is primarily related to two strands of literature. The first of these
examines the efficiency of the REIT market, while the second examines the
drivers of efficiency in general equities markets.
Real estate price discovery and the information aggregation process is central
to the efficient operation of public real estate markets. A number of papers
explore the efficiency of both U.S. and international REIT markets, although
these papers almost exclusively focus on market-level implications and make
no real examination of the cross section. The results in this literature have
been mixed. Seck (1996) examines the substitutability of direct and securitized
real estate and finds that while direct real estate is inefficient, securitized real
estate is priced efficiently at the index level. Nelling and Gyourko (1998)
examine runs tests for a sample of REITs and find that although some REITs
appear to be priced inefficiently, the market as a whole appears efficient.
Jirasakuldech and Knight (2005) examine REIT index-level returns and are
unable to reject the null hypothesis of a random walk using variance ratio
tests. Schindler, Rottke and Fu¨ss (2010) also support this conclusion for
U.S. data, but show that internationally, most securitized real estate markets
reject the null hypothesis of a random walk. These results contrast with
Kuhle and Alvayay (2000), who find the majority of individual REITs deviate
significantly from a random walk, suggesting large-scale inefficiency in the
market. In general, the results reported in the literature are quite sensitive to
the frequency of data employed, the time period examined and the form of
tests used.
The article most closely related to this one is Boehmer and Kelley (2009).
They examine the cross section of measured price efficiency for an extensive
sample of general equities (excluding REITs). Their primary focus is on the
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relationship between institutional ownership and price efficiency. They find
that higher institutional ownership leads to better pricing efficiency.
Data and Methods
To examine firm-level efficiency in the REIT market, we start with a list
of equity REITs included in the SNL Financial universe between 1993 and
2014. We then match this list to the TAQ dataset. The TAQ dataset begins
in 1993, so this places a limit on the historic sample. However, given that
1993 also represents essentially the start of the modern REIT era, it is also
the logical starting point from any examination of REIT efficiency. For this
sample, we develop a comprehensive database of REIT trading from which
we extract appropriate measures of the efficiency of price setting and market
quality. With these measures in hand, we document the evolution of REIT
market efficiency at the REIT level. Our work moves past efficiency “on
average,” in favor of exploiting the entire distribution of measured REIT-
level efficiency across the 1993–2014 period. We then exploit the model
proposed by Boehmer and Kelley (2009) to study the cross section of market
efficiency in the REIT market.
Measuring Market Efficiency
In an efficient market, price movements should approximate a random walk.
Though myriad approaches to measuring efficiency exist, we follow O’Hara
and Ye (2011), Boehmer and Kelley (2009) and Conrad, Wahal and Xiang
(2015), and rely on a variance ratio calculation. As developed in Lo and
Mackinlay (1988), the variance ratio test exploits the fact that the variance
of random walk increments is linear in the sampling interval.6 Consider the
nq + 1 element log price series {p0, p1, . . . , pnq} where q is any integer
greater than one. Define the following estimators:
μˆ = 1
nq
nq∑
k=1
(pk − pk−1), (1)
σ 2a = 1nq−1
nq∑
k=1
(pk − pk−1 − μˆ)2, (2)
σ 2c(q) = 1m
nq∑
k=q
(pk − pk−q − qμˆ)2, (3)
6See Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) for a textbook treatment.
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where μˆ is the estimated mean of the log price increments, σ 2a is the unbiased
estimator of the variance of the 1-period log price increments and σ 2c(q) is
1/q times the unbiased estimator of the variance of the overlapping q-period
log price increments, where m = q(nq − q + 1)(1 − q
nq ). The variance ratio
is then calculated as
V R(q) = σ
2
c(q)
σ 2a
. (4)
For q = 2, the variance ratio is equal to 1 + ρ(1), where ρ(1) is the first-order
autocorrelation coefficient of the log price increments. If an asset follows a
random walk, then ρ(1) = 0, suggesting that the V R should be equal to 1. If
the V R is less than one, it signals mean reversion in returns, whereas a V R
greater than one signals momentum.
Lo and Mackinlay (1988) show that in the presence of heteroskedastic-
ity, the test statistic for the null hypothesis of uncorrelated increments
is
ψ∗(q) =
√
nq( ¯V R(q) − 1)√
ˆθ
a∼ N (0, 1), (5)
where ˆθ = 4
q−1∑
k=1
(1 − kq )2 ˆδk , and ˆδk =
nq
nq∑
j=k+1
(p j −p j−1−μˆ)2(p j−k−p j−k−1−μˆ)2
[
nq∑
j=1
(p j −p j−1−μˆ)2]2
.
In calculating the variance ratio V R(q), the choice of data frequency (the
time interval at which the price increments pk are observed) and the number
of periods, q, are choices of the econometrician. Our choices are driven by a
desire to capture high-frequency dynamics of the price process, without be-
ing subject to microstructure noise. Conrad, Wahal and Xiang (2015) define
their sampling intervals as 15 seconds, which we could mimic, but only for
the years 2006–2014. Prior to this period of time, we do not observe quotes
frequently enough to construct a reliable sequence of 15-second price incre-
ments. Instead, we follow O’Hara and Ye (2011) by setting our return horizon
equal to 15 minutes, and the number of periods, q, to 2. This implies that
the variance ratio compares 15–30-minute log price increments. We believe
that this strikes a reasonable balance and it permits us to track efficiency
consistently over our entire sample.7
7We also examined 15-minute versus 60- and 120-minute increments, and found no
appreciable difference.
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We recognize the vast literature documenting the weaknesses involving infer-
ences based on standard variance ratio tests.8 As such, the reader should use
care when interpreting our inference results. However, the focus of our article
is not one of inference directed narrowly at whether prices of an individual
REIT follow a random walk. Rather, our focus is in documenting the variation
in, and drivers of, efficiency over time and in the cross section.
Trades versus Quotes
The intraday TAQ data include both the complete record of trades and the
quote history for each day for each REIT. It is possible to calculate variance
ratios using either traded prices or quote midpoints. The potential problem
with using traded prices is induced negative serial correlation in prices because
of bid-ask bounce. The essence of bid-ask bounce is trades take place either at
the bid or at the ask price. This dichotomy creates price variation that reflects
the size of the bid-ask spread, but is otherwise unrelated to fundamental
value. As shown by Roll (1984) and Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966), bid-
ask bounce induces a negative serial correlation in the observed price series,
as the price bounces from one boundary to the other (i.e., bounces from the
bid to the ask price and then back again). Empirically, Kaul and Nimalendran
(1990) show that these effects can be quite severe when estimating variance
ratios of small firms using transactions prices. Given the small-cap to mid-cap
nature of the REIT universe, this problem is likely to be quite severe in our
sample.9 For this reason, we follow Boehmer and Kelley (2009) and Conrad,
Wahal and Xiang (2015) and employ quote midpoints, rather than prices, to
estimate variance ratios. To calculate the series of quote midpoints, we employ
the methodology of Holden and Jacobsen (2014). Using bid-to-bid prices as
in Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) would also alleviate bid-ask bounce induced
serial correlation, but because trades are reported less frequently than quotes,
this would limit our ability to estimate higher frequency pricing dynamics,
especially early in our sample.
8The primary problem in the VR test is that the finite sample distribution of the test
statistic is unknown. This is due to the fact that the VR test is most often implemented
with a rolling sample (as suggested by Lo and Mackinlay 1988) to improve power
during inference. The sampling distribution is proxied by the limiting distribution,
which may not be accurate, and this can create size distortions or low power, thereby
generating misleading conclusions during inference. See Charles and Darne (2009)
for a discussion.
9This may in part explain the mixed results in the prior literature on REIT efficiency.
These papers use traded prices, and depending on the frequency of prices and time
period examined, much of the deviation from random walks may be explained by
bid-ask bounce. In unreported analysis, we calculated variance ratios using traded
prices and do observe severe serial correlation, especially in the start of the sample
examined.
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REIT Efficiency over Time
In this section, we document the time-series dynamics of pricing efficiency in
the REIT market over the period 1993–2014. For each quarter in our sample,
we compute the variance ratio for each REIT. Due to the natural birth and
death process of REITs, we are left with an unbalanced panel of variance
ratios. In total there are 251 unique REITs in the sample between 1993 and
2014. The number of firms in the sample in each year can be observed in
Table 1 in the column labeled Firms.
Table 1  Variance ratios by year.
Variance Ratio
Year Firms Obs Mean Std Min Max Significant
1993 38 111 0.976 0.053 0.757 1.102 0.16
1994 95 311 0.980 0.051 0.799 1.145 0.16
1995 121 449 0.968 0.067 0.503 1.217 0.23
1996 124 485 0.968 0.054 0.553 1.204 0.21
1997 125 485 0.973 0.060 0.753 1.213 0.23
1998 135 512 0.983 0.063 0.559 1.143 0.19
1999 130 509 0.965 0.058 0.754 1.246 0.24
2000 125 490 0.957 0.066 0.615 1.219 0.29
2001 117 460 0.969 0.067 0.699 1.201 0.23
2002 112 434 0.995 0.086 0.751 1.231 0.28
2003 109 416 0.948 0.067 0.760 1.137 0.37
2004 113 432 0.945 0.077 0.702 1.203 0.38
2005 117 452 0.967 0.066 0.726 1.150 0.27
2006 108 422 0.948 0.059 0.596 1.096 0.29
2007 96 381 0.969 0.057 0.739 1.152 0.14
2008 94 375 0.959 0.063 0.750 1.463 0.24
2009 93 371 0.994 0.050 0.762 1.144 0.12
2010 98 385 0.975 0.054 0.694 1.114 0.14
2011 103 401 0.974 0.050 0.491 1.131 0.07
2012 105 404 0.961 0.082 0.477 1.097 0.17
2013 111 425 0.962 0.101 0.490 1.142 0.21
2014 118 454 0.962 0.099 0.506 1.142 0.19
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of quarterly variance ratios by year. The
quarterly variance ratios are calculated as in (4), where the frequency of sampling of
price increments is 15 minutes and q equals 2, so that the variance ratio compares the
variance of 30-minute returns calculated over the quarter and the variance of 15-minute
returns calculated over the quarter. Returns are calculated from quote midpoints, which
are calculated from TAQ data using the methods of Holden and Jacobsen (2014).
“Significant” is the percentage of variance ratio tests (5) that can be rejected at the
5% level of significance.
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Characterizing the Empirical Distribution
How efficient is the REIT market on average? Do many REITs deviate
from a variance ratio of 1? If so, how does efficiency evolve over time?
To address these questions, we construct the quarterly variance ratios for
each REIT trading in a given year, and repeat for each year from 1993–
2014. For each year in the sample, these distributions are depicted in
Figure 1. The first thing to note is that the center mass of these distribu-
tions is consistently near one, indicating the typical REIT appears efficient.
However, we do observe the distribution of variance ratios appears to differ
across years. Some years, such as 2009, are very tightly centered around
one, while other years, such as 1998, have long left tails. Even within a
year like 2009 where the distribution is heavily centered at one, we still ob-
serve considerable cross-sectional variation. This suggests that efficiency is
dynamic in nature. To address this more precisely, we conduct a two-sample
Kolomogorov–Smirnov (K-S) test of equal empirical distributions for each
pair of adjacent years. For instance, we compare the empirical distribution
of 1994 to that of 1995. The p-value of the K-S test statistic for that com-
parison is 0.011, suggesting that we can reject the null of equal empirical
distributions. We repeat this test for each of the 21 pairs of adjacent years,
and find that we are able to reject the null at the 5% level for 16 of the
21 pairwise comparisons. These test results suggest that the distributions do
indeed change over time.
The visual findings in Figure 1 are corroborated by the summary statistics
provided in Table 1, where we report the descriptive statistics of the quarterly
variance ratios by year. In the column headed “significant,” we report the
percentage of variance ratio tests for that year that reject the null hypothesis
of a random walk at the 5% level of significance. In each year, we observe
that the mean variance ratio is close to one. The lowest average variance
ratio occurs in 2004 with a value of 0.945, while the highest average occurs
in 2002 with an average variance ratio of 0.995. In each year, we observe
a substantial range of variance ratios, with the lowest and highest variance
ratios in any given year differing by approximately 0.5. The variance ratio
tests corroborate this. In total, 22.4% of the variance ratio tests reject the null
hypothesis of a random walk at the 5% level of significance. However, this
percentage is not constant across years, with a low of 7.1% in 2011 and a
high of 38.0% in 2004. These tests provide further evidence that efficiency
in the REIT market is dynamic in nature.
The Dynamics of REIT Pricing Efficiency 11
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Determinants of Efficiency Dynamics
In this section, we explore the factors that drive the cross-sectional dynam-
ics within the distribution of measured price efficiency. We begin by dis-
cussing the model and estimation in the first subsection, the data in the
second subsection, followed by results of panel regressions in the final
subsection.
Model and Estimation
The empirical approach we use largely reflects the work of Boehmer and
Kelley (2009). The main empirical obstacle in examining firm efficiency is the
obvious potential for endogeneity. For instance, it is possible that institutional
ownership leads to higher levels of efficiency through a standard information
production channel. However, it is also possible that institutions just have a
preference for investing in efficient firms. Lacking a clean natural experiment,
the standard approach in the literature has been to regress current measures of
efficiency on the lagged dependent variable and lagged explanatory variables:
|1 − V R|i,t = α + β|1 − V R|i,t−1 + γk Xi,t−1 + 
i,t , (6)
where |1 − V R|i,t is the absolute value of one minus the variance ratio of
firm i in period t , and Xi,t−1 is a vector of K explanatory variables related to
firm i in period t − 1. Given the unbalanced panel nature of the sample, we
estimate (6) using a fixed effects panel regression model.
Employing raw variance ratios as the dependent variable in (6) is problematic
because variance ratios both greater and less than one signal inefficiency. To
address this, we follow Boehmer and Kelley (2009) and employ |1 − V R|
*100 as our dependent variable. For this variable, larger values are related to
higher levels of inefficiency; either mean reverting or momentum.
In Table 2, we report descriptive statistics for |1 − V R|*100 by year. As with
the case of the raw variance ratios in Table 1, we observe both time-series
and cross-sectional variation. We observe the lowest level of average pricing
inefficiency in 2009 and the highest level in 2004. In each year, we observe
considerable variation in inefficiency.
There are several candidates for explanatory variables, X , in this framework.
We divide them into four groups: institutional ownership, index inclusion,
information pricing and information production.
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Table 2  Pricing efficiency by year.
|1 − VR|∗100
Year Obs Mean Std Min Max
1993 111 4.191 3.989 0.043 24.323
1994 311 4.059 3.584 0.002 20.099
1995 449 5.134 5.352 0.012 49.680
1996 485 4.688 4.174 0.003 44.650
1997 485 5.076 4.087 0.002 24.682
1998 512 4.749 4.500 0.032 44.065
1999 509 5.274 4.188 0.009 24.603
2000 490 6.084 5.051 0.003 38.503
2001 460 5.665 4.641 0.011 30.076
2002 434 6.847 5.167 0.030 24.923
2003 416 6.756 5.094 0.005 23.984
2004 432 7.641 5.586 0.001 29.805
2005 452 5.807 4.583 0.004 27.350
2006 422 6.074 5.079 0.020 40.417
2007 381 4.998 4.127 0.010 26.114
2008 375 5.733 4.836 0.007 46.331
2009 371 3.656 3.425 0.020 23.833
2010 385 4.682 3.773 0.028 30.553
2011 401 3.747 4.251 0.009 50.909
2012 404 5.049 7.549 0.007 52.256
2013 425 6.279 8.834 0.005 51.013
2014 454 6.084 8.635 0.025 49.363
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of quarterly pricing efficiency by year.
Pricing efficiency is measured as |1 − V R|∗100, where V R is the quarterly variance
ratio. The quarterly variance ratios are calculated as in (4), where the frequency of
sampling of price increments is 15 minutes and q equals 2, so that the variance
ratio compares the variance of 30-minute returns calculated over the quarter and the
variance of 15-minute returns calculated over the quarter. Returns are calculated from
quote midpoints, which are calculated from TAQ data using the methods of Holden
and Jacobsen (2014).
Ownership
One dimension along which REITs potentially differ from other pub-
lic companies is institutional ownership. Part of the requirements in
26 U.S.C. §856(a)(6) for a firm to maintain its REIT status is diverse own-
ership. The requirement is that at no time during the second half of the year
can five or fewer individuals own, directly or indirectly, 50% or more of
the REIT. This effectively limits the ability of owners to build large block
positions in the firm. In 1993, a look-through provision was enacted with re-
gard to the closely held stock rule, which relaxed this restriction for pension
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funds.10 Although not as binding a constraint as it once was due to the 1993
look-through provision, REITs typically will have ownership restrictions as
part of their corporate charter to avoid conflicting with the closely-held stock
rule.
Although the regulation related to institutional ownership is different in RE-
ITs compared to other public companies, the role of institutional investors
is the same. In our context, informed trading refers to the trader’s ability to
acquire and accurately assimilate information regarding the firm’s value. Prior
studies such as Ke and Petroni (2004) and Yan and Zhang (2009) find insti-
tutions do appear to behave in a way that suggests they are better informed.
All else equal, we expect stocks with a higher proportion of informed trading
to generate higher informational efficiency, and thus a variance ratio closer
to 1. The focus on institutional ownership in the Boehmer and Kelley (2009)
model is based upon the informational advantage of institutional traders.
This advantage may come from access to privileged information (e.g., “in-
sider” information) and/or from the professional investor’s enhanced ability
to process information. Regardless of the source, more institutional investors
suggest more efficient trading. Countering this is the possibility that if insti-
tutions are pure “indexers,” they are unlikely to provide any informational
benefits.
To measure institutional ownership, we follow the methodology proposed
by Yan and Zhang (2009) and calculate four institutional ownership vari-
ables using the underlying ownership data from Thomson Financial’s 13f
database.11 This dataset includes ownership by managers meeting the report-
ing criteria in 17 C.F.R. §240.13f-1, which includes what we typically think
of as institutional investors (e.g., hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds,
insurance companies and ETFs.) Total institutional ownership (TIO) is the
level of ownership by all institutions. We then decompose the total level of
institutional ownership into three components based on the frequency of trad-
ing of the underlying institutions. Short-term institutional ownership (SIO) is
the percentage ownership of the REIT held by institutions in the top decile
10See Downs (1998) for a discussion of the rule change and the situation that led up
to it.
11Studies focusing on REIT institutional ownership tend to categorize institutions by
their legal type (bank, pension fund, investment company, etc.). See, for example,
Devos et al. (2013) and Ciochetti, Craft and Shilling (2002). One exception is An, Wu
and Wu (2016) who use the classification system of Bushee (1998), which relies on the
underlying behavior of the institutional investors. In unreported results, an examination
of ownership by different legal types shows that ownership by different legal types
looks quite similar between REITs and non-REITs with both being dominated by
institutional investment advisors.
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Figure 2  Institutional ownership.
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: This figure plots the average level of institutional ownership by quarter from 1993 to 2014.
TIO, SIO, MIO and LIO are the percentage of shares held by all institutional owners, owners
in the top decile of portfolio turnover, owners with above-median portfolio turnover (excluding
the top decile) and owners with below-median portfolio turnover. TIO, SIO, MIO and LIO are
calculated using the method proposed by Yan and Zhang (2009). Underlying ownership data
come from Thomson Reuter’s 13(f) database.
of portfolio turnover, long-term institutional ownership (LIO) is the percent-
age ownership of the REIT held by institutions with below-median portfolio
turnover and medium-term institutional ownership (MIO) is the percentage
of ownership of the REIT held by institutions with above-median portfolio
turnover (excluding the top decile). If information is impounded into asset
prices through active trading, it is possible that what matters for efficiency is
the level of ownership held by the most active traders.
Figure 2 plots the average level of institutional ownership through time for
the sample. As is evident in the figure, the level of TOI in the sample has
increased through time. The likely explanation for the long-term trend is
that our sample covers what is commonly referred to as the “modern REIT
era.” During this period of time, the REIT industry has expanded and has
become more integrated with the broader capital markets. Because REITs are
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capital-constrained due to their high payout requirements, they need to raise
capital to invest.12 Thus, industry expansion has gone hand in hand with
broader capital markets integration.
Notice that this increase in ownership has been driven by low turnover institu-
tions. While the holdings of institutions with above-median portfolio turnover
have remained fairly constant, holdings by below-median turnover institutions
have increased dramatically. This is especially true for the period after 2001,
when REITs became eligible for inclusion in major S&P indices. In this
sense, the figure demonstrates the dramatic rise in the indexation of the REIT
market.
To further examine this issue, we calculate the level of TIO, SIO, MIO and
LIO for the universe of non-REIT firms over the same time period. While TIO
trends upward for both samples, REITs have dramatically higher TIO at the
end of the sample period than non-REITs (70.0% vs. 44.5%). This is driven by
the increase in LIO in the REIT market post-2001. By the end of the sample,
42.0% of REIT shares are held by passive institutions, while this figure is
only 22.4% for non-REITs. Interestingly, the average level of ownership by
extremely active institutions is quite similar across both samples.
In Table 3, we report descriptive statistics for SIO, MIO and LIO by year
for the sample. The overall increasing trend in institutional ownership among
REITs is quite evident, but so is the high degree of cross-sectional variation.
Even in the early part of the sample when the REIT industry was quite
small, we still observe firms with high institutional ownership. Interestingly,
this tended to be because of more active institutional owners as opposed to
passive owners. The rise in passive owners coincides with inclusion of the
REITs in the S&P indices in 2001. Between 2001 and 2014, the average
level of LIO more than doubled going from 19.2% to 42%. During the same
time period, the growth in ownership by short-term and medium-term owners
was much more modest. The average level of SIO increased from 1.0%
to 2.5%, while the average level of MIO increased from 23.5% to 28.8%.
The net result being that ownership by passive institutional owners dominates
the market by the end of the sample period. Although passive owners dominate
the sample, at the firm level we observe some firms that have little passive
ownership and others that have a quarter of their shares held by highly
active institutional traders.
12See Ott, Riddiogh and Yi (2005) for a discussion of REIT investment and Boudry
(2011) and Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2013) for a discussion of REIT payout policy.
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Index Inclusions
One of the substantial changes in the REIT industry over the sample pe-
riod has been the inclusion of REITs in major market indices.13 In 2001,
Equity Office Properties was the first REIT added to the S&P 500. Since
that time, the indexation of the REIT market has been quite dramatic. By
2015, 22 REITs were included in the S&P 500, 31 were included in the
mid-cap S&P 400 and 31 were included in the small-cap S&P 600. Inclusion
in these indices may explain part of the large increase in LIO after 2001,
as REITs entered the portfolios of passive index funds. Index inclusion is
likely to improve efficiency by improving microstructure fundamentals, and
by increasing information production through higher analyst coverage and
institutional ownership. It also likely expands the REIT investor base from
those focused on real estate to a larger audience of general equity investors.
We obtain S&P index constituents and addition dates from COMPUSTAT,
NAREIT and press releases. S&P 500, S&P 400 and S&P 600 are dummy
variables equal to one if the firm was in one of these respective indexes during
the quarter.
Information Pricing
The quality of the trading environment in which an REIT trades is also likely
to have a material impact on how efficiently the firm is priced. To capture these
influences, we include several measures from the microstructure literature in
addition to dummy variables related to the tick regime and Reg NMS. Tick
sizes changed from 1/8th to 1/16th on June 23, 1997, from 1/16th to decimals
on January 28, 2001, and the implementation of RegNMS started on July 1,
2007.
Spread to Depth is the ratio of the quoted spread to the quoted depth, both of
which are calculated daily from the underlying TAQ data and averaged over
the quarter. As Boehmer and Kelley (2009, p. 3755, footnote 18) note, this
combined measure is superior to either individual measure entered alone: “a
decline in quoted spreads is often associated with a contemporaneous decline
in quoted size. In this case, a trader benefits from the decline in spread for part
of his intended trade. But for a given trade size, he may be worse off if the
supply schedule ‘behind’ the best quote has become steeper. Alternatively, a
trader may simply prefer a larger quoted size at a slightly wider spread.” We
use the methods outlined in Holden and Jacobsen (2014) to calculate spreads
and depth using the TAQ data.
13See Ambrose, Lee and Peek (2007) and Pavlov, Steiner and Wachter (2017) for a
discussion of REIT index inclusions and return behavior.
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Illiquidity is likely to negatively impact the efficiency of pricing. Stocks that
are hard to trade are less likely to be targeted by arbitrageurs. To capture this
effect, we include Amihud, the Amihud (2002) measure as an inverse proxy
for the liquidity of a particular REIT. By definition, the Amihud illiquidity
measure is given by |r |/DV O L , where the numerator is the absolute value
of the return on a given day and the denominator is the dollar volume of
trade that same day (and is equal to the firm’s total market equity value
times the firm’s share turnover on that day). Using CRSP tape data, we
calculate the average of this measure over the quarter for each REIT in the
sample.
To capture the effect of trading volume, we include Turnover, the average
daily turnover for the company for the quarter from CRSP. If efficiency and
institutional ownership are simply driven by trading volume, then this should
control for that effect.
Finally, firms that are larger or with higher stock prices may be less costly to
trade. To control for this, we include Size, the log of firm market capitalization
and Price, the log of the firm’s stock price.
Information Production
Institutions are just one potential avenue of information production for a com-
pany. Information production is also likely to be higher around the issuance
of securities to the market. REITs that have just issued equity (common or
preferred) or debt seem likely to have provided substantial information to the
markets in the process of selling new securities. From NAREIT, we gather
a complete record of REIT-specific debt and equity issues during the 1993–
2014 period. We use this to construct two dummy variables, Issued Equity
and Issued Debt, which indicates for every REIT whether securities were
issued in that quarter.14 This is a rough proxy for whether the information
environment has changed.
From IBES, we extract the record of analyst coverage for each REIT in our
sample. Analysts is the number of analysts providing coverage for the REIT
in a given quarter. Compared to other public companies, the level of analyst
coverage in the REIT universe is quite low.15 Higher analyst coverage should
be related to more information production, although exactly what effect this
14See Giacomini, Ling and Naranjo (2017) for a discussion of REIT capital structure
choices.
15See Downs and Gu¨ner (1999), Downs and Gu¨ner (2000) and Boudry, Kallberg and
Liu (2011).
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will have on pricing efficiency is unclear. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) find
evidence that analyst coverage may improve pricing efficiency. However,
Downs and Gu¨ner (1999) and Downs and Gu¨ner (2000) find that increased
analyst attention in REITs leads to lower liquidity. Lower liquidity should,
all things equal, lead to inferior pricing efficiency.
REITs engaged in significant investment or divestment activity are also likely
to have a different informational environment from other REITs. To proxy
this effect, we include in our analysis Investment, the absolute value of a
firm’s cash flow from investment activity during the quarter divided by total
assets at the start of the quarter. We obtain the firm’s total assets from SNL
Financial and cash flow from investment activities from COMPUSTAT and the
firm’s financial statements. We do not lag this variable because the direction
of causality is fairly clear. Changes in investment policy should affect firm
efficiency, while the opposite is a dramatically harder argument to make.
We also employ two measures from the microstructure literature to examine
information production. Quote Changes is the ratio of NBBO quote changes
to total NBBO quotes each day (averaged over the quarter). A large number
of changes in NBBO quotes relative to the total number of quotes indicates
a high information flow for the firm. Quotes to Trades is the ratio of quotes
to trades. We compute our quarterly measure by taking the average of the
number of NBBO quotes each day (from TAQ) relative to the number of
trades (from the CRSP tape). Our measure is similar to an approach taken in
Boehmer, Fong and Wu (2012). A high number of quotes relative to trades
suggest greater information flow for the firm. One limitation of these measures
is that they may also be driven by the trading strategies of high-frequency
traders (HFTs).
The final measure of information production we employ is Rated, a dummy
variable indicating whether the firm has a credit rating with any of the three
major rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch). Firms with credit ratings
should, all things equal, have greater information production, although the
recent literature casts some doubt on the information content of ratings.16 We
obtain rating agency information from SNL Financial.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
As expected from Table 3, the average level of TOI is 59.3%, composed of
16See, for example, Bolton, Frexias and Shapiro (2012).
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Table 4  Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std Min Max
TIO 9,164 0.593 0.283 0.000 1.000
LIO 9,164 0.315 0.195 0.000 1.000
MIO 9,164 0.262 0.144 0.000 0.838
SIO 9,164 0.016 0.026 0.000 0.336
S&P 500 9,164 0.058 0.233 0.000 1.000
S&P 400 9,164 0.086 0.280 0.000 1.000
S&P 600 9,164 0.103 0.304 0.000 1.000
Amihud 9,164 0.187 1.536 0.000 39.11
Spread to Depth 9,164 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.492
Quote Changes 9,164 0.121 0.136 0.002 1.000
Quote to Trade 9,164 14.76 18.31 0.016 365.8
Turnover 9,164 0.558 0.587 0.013 8.077
Size 9,164 1.834 3.560 0.003 51.70
Price 9,164 26.23 20.22 0.344 184.9
Regime 2 9,164 0.205 0.404 0.000 1.000
Regime 3 9,164 0.306 0.461 0.000 1.000
Regime 4 9,164 0.328 0.470 0.000 1.000
Rated 9,164 0.393 0.488 0.000 1.000
Issued Equity 9,164 0.109 0.312 0.000 1.000
Issued Debt 9,164 0.084 0.277 0.000 1.000
Analysts 9,164 6.498 5.304 0.000 26.00
Investment 9,164 0.092 0.137 0.000 2.543
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the
analysis. SIO, MIO and LIO are calculated using the method proposed by Yan and
Zhang (2009) and represent the percentage of shares held by institutional owners in
the top decile of portfolio turnover, above-median portfolio turnover (excluding the
top decile) and below-median portfolio turnover, respectively. Underlying ownership
data come from Thomson Reuter’s 13(f) database. S&P 500, S&P 400 and S&P 600
are dummy variables equal to one if the firm is part of the S&P 500, S&P 400 or
S&P 600 during the quarter. Index constituent data are obtained from NAREIT and
COMPUSTAT. Amihud is the quarterly average of the daily ratio of absolute returns to
dollar volume for each firm calculated from CRSP. Turnover is the quarterly average
of daily share turnover calculated from CRSP. Spread to Depth is the quarterly average
of the daily quoted spread to quoted depth for each firm calculated from TAQ data.
Size is the firm’s market capitalization, and Price is the firm’s share price. Regime 2,
Regime 3 and Regime 4 are dummy variables equal to one if the quarter falls under
the 1/16th, decimal or Regulation NMS regimes. The 1/8th regime is the omitted
group. Rated is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a credit rating with
one of the three major credit rating agencies. Issue Equity and Issue Debt are dummy
variables equal to one if the firm issued equity or debt during the quarter. Analysts
is the number of analysts covering the firm taken from IBES. Quote Change is the
ratio of NBBO quote changes to the total NBBO quotes each day, averaged over the
quarter. Quotes to Trades is the ratio of quotes to trades each day, averaged over
the quarter. Investment is the absolute value of the firm’s cash flow from investment
activity during the quarter divided by total assets at the start of the quarter, taken from
SNL Financial, COMPUSTAT and firm financial statements.
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1.6% short-term owners, 31.5% long-term owners and the remainder being
medium-term owners. For each ownership variable, we observe considerable
cross-sectional variation.
On average, between 5% and 10% of the sample is in the S&P 500, the
mid-cap S&P 400 or the small-cap S&P 600 in any quarter. By the end of
our sample period, approximately half of the REITs in the sample are in one
of those indices. In total, 81 of the 251 REITs in the sample have been part
of a major S&P index between 1993 and 2014. We conduct difference in
means t-tests of the REITs included in an index versus those not, and find
the included REITs tend to be more efficient. For S&P 500 REITs, the mean
difference in |1 − V R| * 100 is 1.93 with a t-statistic of 7.89, for the S&P
400, it is 1.68 with a t-statistic of 8.29 and for the S&P 600, it is 0.89 with
a t-statistic of 4.67.
For all of the microstructure variables, we observe a high degree of variation
in the sample. The mean level of Amihud is 0.187, on average 12.1% of
quotes are related to quote changes and there are 14.76 quotes per trade. The
average daily turnover in the sample is 0.558%.
Following Boehmer and Kelley (2009), we control for share price and firm
size in our analysis. The small-/mid-cap nature of the REIT universe is evident
in Table 4, with the average firm size being $1.83B. Although we concentrate
on only one industry, there is a great deal of cross-sectional variation of
firm size in the sample. The one caveat is that even the largest firm in
the sample has a market cap of only $51.7B. This is very much a small-
cap/mid-cap sample, but that is also interesting in that most microstructure
studies tend to focus on larger firms. At the start of the sample period,
the median firm size is in the 25th percentile of NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX
market cap break points. In the latter part of the sample, the median firm
size is consistently between the 35th and 45th percentile break point each
year.
Turning to the information production proxies, we observe that on average
39.3% of firms in any given quarter have a credit rating with one of the three
major rating agencies. Our data show 10.9% of firms issue equity in any
given quarter and 8.4% issue debt.
On average, an REIT in the sample is covered by 6.49 analysts in any given
quarter, although some REITs are not covered at all, while others have over
25 analysts covering them. The level of coverage also varies over the sample
period. In fact, analyst coverage is virtually nonexistent in the sample prior
to the late 1990s. This is not overly surprising given that during this time
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period, many REITs lacked what Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2011) show are
the common drivers of analyst coverage.
The average ratio of the absolute value of cash flow from investment activity
to total assets is 9.2%. The extremes of Investment are also interesting because
they represent true economic events. The extreme values of this variable are
related to planned liquidations and mergers and acquisitions. While these
transactions are not the norm for most firms in most periods, if the goal of
the exercise is to understand what drives pricing efficiency, then events such
as these may contribute to understanding this phenomenon.
Principal Results
Table 5 reports our main quarterly estimation results. The dependent variable
for all regressions is |1−VR| * 100. The explanatory variables in the analysis
related to institutional ownership, analyst coverage and microstructure are all
lagged one period. The remaining variables are contemporaneous, because
the direction for causality for these variables is more apparent. We include
both firm and year fixed effects as specified.17 Firm-clustered t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
In Model 1 of Table 5, we include only the total level of institutional owner-
ship in the regression. In Model 2, we include the decomposition of TIO into
SIO, MIO and LIO to examine the effect of active versus passive institutional
owners. Models 3 and 4 examine the effect of firm and year fixed effects
on the estimation. In Models 5 and 6, we address the potential for Nickell
(1981) bias by removing the lagged dependent variable in Model 5 and re-
porting bootstrap-bias corrected results following the method of Everaert and
Pozzi (2007) in Model 6.18
Turning to Model 1 in Table 5, we find that TIO has no effect of pricing
efficiency: the coefficient on TIO is small and not significantly different from
17We have also estimated the models removing the microstructure regime dummy
variables and including quarter fixed effects. The results are similar to those reported.
We have also removed firm fixed effects and included property type effects for each
REIT. The results are similar and none of the property-type dummy variables was
significant.
18The model presented is a dynamic panel data model because of the inclusion of the
lagged dependent variable. Such models potentially suffer from Nickell (1981) bias
when N is large and T is small. While no standard exists for what qualifies as “large
N /small T ” in the literature, our panel is unlikely to fit the definition because of our
large time series, suggesting that Nickell (1981) bias is unlikely to be an issue in our
estimation. This is supported by the consistent results between our main estimation
and estimations excluding firm fixed effects, excluding the lagged dependent variable,
and estimations using the bias correction of Everaert and Pozzi (2007).
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Table 6  Index additions: event analysis.
Obs  |1−VR| p-Value
All Indexes
15-day Windows 68 −1.04 0.03
30-day Windows 68 −0.93 0.06
60-day Windows 68 −1.12 0.03
S&P 500 Large-Cap
15-day Windows 18 −0.37 0.73
30-day Windows 18 −0.83 0.22
60-day Windows 18 −1.54 0.12
S&P 400 Mid-Cap
15-day Windows 23 −1.73 0.02
30-day Windows 23 −1.82 0.05
60-day Windows 23 −1 .00 0.31
S&P 600 Small-Cap
15-day Windows 27 −0.89 0.24
30-day Windows 27 −0.24 0.78
60-day Windows 27 −0.96 0.26
Note: This table reports mean changes in efficiency around index addition dates. The
change in efficiency is measured as the difference in |1 − V R|∗100 between the post-
and preestimation windows. V R is the variance ratio estimated in 15-, 30- and 60-day
windows before and after the index addition date. A 10-day addition window centered
at the addition date is excluded from the analysis. The variance ratios are calculated as
(4), where the frequency of sampling of price increments is 15 minutes and q equals
2. Returns are calculated from quote midpoint and quote midpoints are calculated
from TAQ data using the methods of Holden and Jacobsen (2014). Index addition
dates were collected from COMPUSTAT, NAREIT and press releases. p-Values are
reported for the test of the null hypothesis that the change is equal to zero.
zero. This is different from Boehmer and Kelley (2009), who find a signif-
icantly positive relationship (higher TIO leads to better pricing efficiency).
However, the level of TIO may not be as important as the number of active
traders. This is especially true for the REIT market, because the level of
passive institutional ownership is nearly twice what is observed in a sample
of general equities.
We also observe the significant effect of index inclusion on efficiency, espe-
cially for the S&P 500 and mid-cap S&P 400. S&P 500 firms are on average
25% more efficient than nonindex firms, while S&P 400 firms are on av-
erage 15% more efficient. There is a potential identification issue involved.
It is possible that S&P’s selection criteria for index additions are correlated
with firm efficiency. To try and disentangle causality, in Table 6, we examine
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changes in efficiency around index inclusion dates.19 We calculate variance
ratios in 15-, 30- and 60-day windows before and after the index addition
date. To avoid potential information leakage issues, we exclude the 10-day
window centered around the addition date from our analysis. We then calcu-
late the change in efficiency, |1 − V R|, between the two estimation windows.
If indexes simply add firms that are already efficient, then we would expect
to see no significant change between the two estimation windows. On the
other hand, if index inclusion does increase efficiency, then we would expect
|1 − V R| to be smaller in the postaddition window and the change to be neg-
ative. Our selection of the size of the estimation windows was driven by two
motivations. First, smaller windows around the addition date should enable
stronger identification because it gives less time for confounding events to
occur. Second, smaller estimation windows are likely to lead to noisier esti-
mates of variance ratios because of limited data. The windows we estimate
hopefully balance these two factors.
For the overall sample of index additions (S&P 500, S&P 400 and S&P 600),
we find that the change in |1 − V R| * 100 is −1.04, −0.931 and −1.12
in the 15-, 30- and 60-day windows, respectively. These are significantly
different from zero at the 5% level for the 15- and 60-day windows, and
significant at the 10% level for the 30-day window. Given that the average
level of |1 − V R| * 100 reported in the sample is 5.44, they also represent
economically meaningful changes. Thus, it appears that inclusion in any
major S&P index improves efficiency. To see if this effect is consistent across
indices, we then repeat this exercise for each index. For the S&P 500, the
15-, 30- and 60-day changes are −0.37, −0.83 and −1.54. None of these
were significantly different from zero at conventional levels. For the S&P
400, the 15-, 30- and 60-day changes are −1.73, −1.82 and −1.0. These
are significantly different from zero for the 15- and 30-day windows, and
represent approximately a 30% improvement in pricing efficiency compared
to the average firm in the sample. Finally, for the S&P 600, the 15-, 30- and
60-day changes are −0.89, −0.24 and −0.96. None of these were significantly
different from zero at conventional levels.
The results for the changes in efficiency around index inclusions suggest
interesting conclusions. Joining the S&P 500 is not in and of itself beneficial.
It appears that the REITs joining this index were already priced efficiently.
This may not be surprising given the unique situation the REIT industry went
19The number of REIT addition dates does not match the number of REITs in an
index in the panel sample, because numerous REITs had not elected REIT status at
the time they entered an index. That is, they became REITs after they were included
in the index.
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through in being added to the S&P 500. Subsequent REIT additions were all
large and well known. In this sense, it is not difficult to think that, perhaps,
these firms were just always priced efficiently. Similarly, joining the S&P 600
small-cap index has a minimal effect, likely because these are still very small
firms. On the other hand, joining the S&P 400 mid-cap index appears to be
an efficiency-changing event. The results from our panel analysis suggest that
these improvements are persistent, even controlling for a myriad of factors
(such as turnover, liquidity and institutional ownership) that could explain
why being added to the index improves efficiency.
Returning to Table 5, we also find some evidence of the impact of market mi-
crostructure on pricing efficiency. The negative coefficient on Turnover shows
that firms whose stock trades more frequently are priced more efficiently.20
As expected, higher stock prices are associated with better efficiency, because
higher prices mean lower percentage transaction costs for fixed tick size. Con-
trolling for other factors, the implementation of Reg NMS tended to have a
positive impact on efficiency.
We find some evidence that information production impacts efficiency. The
negative coefficient on Analysts indicates that higher analyst coverage is
associated with better efficiency. This is consistent with Boehmer and Kelley
(2009). The consistency of this result with other public companies shows the
integration with the broader capital markets that REITs have experienced in
the last decade.
An unexpected result related to information production is the significantly
positive coefficient on Issued Debt. Firms issuing debt appear to have inferior
pricing efficiency relative to other firms. Our expectation was that the release
of information (use of proceeds, etc.) surrounding a debt issuance would lead
to better pricing efficiency. To examine this effect more carefully, we compare
the pricing efficiency of debt-issuing firms in the quarters before, during and
after debt issuance. We find that pricing inefficiency in the period during
issuance is significantly larger than the quarter before and the quarter after.
There is also no difference in pricing efficiency between the before and after
quarters. This suggests debt-issuing firms are not always priced inefficiently,
rather they are priced inefficiently in the quarter they issue debt. In fact, in the
quarter before and after issuance, they have pricing efficiency that is slightly
20To examine the joint significance of Turnover and Amihud, we have conducted Wald
tests of joint significance. These are significant at the 5% level only in the models
where Turnover was individually significant. If we exclude Turnover from the analysis,
Amihud is insignificantly different from zero. We have conducted a similar exercise
for Quote Changes and Quotes to Trades and they are only jointly significant in the
model excluding firm fixed effects.
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better than the average firm in the sample. This suggests that this result is
not driven by information production. A more likely explanation is that the
firm needed to raise capital, and faced with pricing inefficiency in the firm’s
equity, the managers chose to issue debt. We know from Boudry, Kallberg
and Liu (2010) that REITs will issue debt over equity when they trade at
discounts to NAV, so the notion that REIT managers would choose debt over
equity as a funding source when their equity is trading inefficiently is quite
plausible.
The final result from Model 1 is the negative and significant coefficient on
Investment. A one standard deviation increase in Investment is associated
with a 3.8% improvement in pricing efficiency. Given the extreme range of
the variable, there is the potential for large economic effects.21
To assess whether all institutional owners have the same effect on efficiency,
we split TIO into LIO, MIO and SIO in Model 2 of Table 5. The coefficient on
SIO is statistically significant, while the coefficients on LIO and MIO are not.
Economically, a one standard deviation increase in SIO is related to a 2.3%
improvement in efficiency. In this sense, it appears that it is only the extremely
active traders that are driving pricing efficiency in the REIT market. Notice
that because of the high range in this variable, individual firm effects could be
economically quite large. In unreported results, we examine the sensitivity of
this result to the definition of active traders. As expected, as less active traders
enter into the definition of SIO by increasing the decile cutoff, the coefficient
quickly becomes insignificantly different from zero. Although we do not find
evidence that passive institutions (LIO) help efficiency, we also do not find
evidence that they decrease it either. This suggests that the large increase in
passive institutional ownership that the REIT market has experienced since
the inclusion of REITs in the S&P indices in 2001 has not had a detrimental
impact on pricing efficiency in the sector.
In Models 3 and 4, we remove year effects and firm-fixed effects. Removing
these effects does not change the main results we have previously discussed.
Similarly, using the bias-corrected estimation technique of Everaert and Pozzi
(2007) in Model 6 does not change our conclusions. This once again suggests
that Nickell (1981) bias is not a serious issue in our estimation.
Conclusion
Using individual REIT pricing data, we estimate the time-varying distribution
of REIT-level variance ratios covering the 1993–2014 period. Our motivation
21In unreported results, we have also included dummy variables for M&A activity in
the estimation. These were all insignificantly different from zero.
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for examining the REIT market is twofold. First, there is scant evidence on
the firm-level efficiency of the REIT market. Those papers that do exist focus
primarily on market-level efficiency. While interesting, both participants in
the market and managers face firm-level decisions. So, it is efficiency at this
level that is important to these groups. Second, while the finance literature has
examined efficiency for general equities, these studies exclude REITs. Given
the unique nature of both the REIT business model compared to general
equities, and also the extreme changes that have occurred in the industry
during the sample period, it is not obvious that prior results can be easily
extended to the REIT market.
Our estimates show that the average REIT is efficiently priced, but there are
many REITs that are clearly not efficiently priced at any given point in time.
We find examples of both persistence and mean reversion in the returns of
individual REITs.
Following the approach of Boehmer and Kelley (2009), we also examine the
determinants of deviations from pricing efficiency. We find that a higher level
of ownership by active institutional investors is associated with improved pric-
ing efficiency. While passive institutional investors do not appear to improve
efficiency, we find no evidence that they hurt efficiency. This indicates that
the dramatic increase in passive institutional ownership in the REIT market
has not been detrimental to the efficient pricing of the sector.
One of the unique changes in the REIT market during our sample period has
been the addition of REITs to major market indices. Prior to 2001, REITs
were excluded from all S&P indices. We find that REITs that are part of the
S&P 500 or S&P 400 (but not the S&P 600) are more efficiently priced than
other REITs. Examining changes in efficiency around index inclusion dates,
we find that the result for the S&P 500 REITs is likely driven by sample
selection, because there is no significant change in efficiency for firms that
enter this index. This is consistent with the notion that REITs added to
the S&P 500 are in some sense unique. They are large by REIT market
standards, and also have significant investor attention before they were added
to the index. For the mid-cap S&P 400, we find significant improvements in
efficiency around index inclusion. The change in efficiency for these firms is
likely due to the large change in investor exposure that entering this index
provides. These firms go from small-cap obscurity into the mid-cap universe
of firms. We find no change in efficiency for the small firms in the S&P 600.
In August 2016, MSCI and S&P created the 11th Global Industry Classifica-
tion Standard (GICS) sector that separates real estate stocks from financials.
Although the event is outside of our sample period, the results of our article do
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suggest some likely consequences from this event. To the extent that separat-
ing real estate from financials increases institutional ownership, this is likely
to only have a net positive impact on efficiency for REITs. The degree of this
impact will be determined by the composition of the institutions that trade
the new GICS. If these are simply passive index funds and the GICS becomes
the index they track, then this is unlikely to improve efficiency. However, if
it attracts more active managers, then this is likely to improve efficiency. Our
results related to index inclusions suggest minimal effects. The REITs that
are already indexed (which is a substantial portion of the industry) already
trade quite efficiently. Our insignificant results for the small firms entering
the S&P 600 suggest that the remaining small REITs that are not in any index
presently are unlikely to benefit from simply being part of the new GICS. We
leave a complete examination of this event to future research.
From an information production perspective, we find that increased analyst
coverage has a beneficial impact on pricing efficiency. Finally, we find some
evidence that firms involved in investment or divestment activity during a
quarter tend to be priced more efficiently. Overall, our results add to our
understanding of pricing efficiency in the REIT market, especially at the firm
level.
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